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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 90-6105
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JOHN H. EVANS, Jr., PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit
[May 26, 1992]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We granted certiorari, 500 U. S. - (1991), to resolve a
conflict in the Circuits over the question whether an
affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a
demand, is an element of the offense of extortion ``under
color of official right'' prohibited by the Hobbs Act, 18
U. S. C. 1951.  We agree with the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit that it is not, and therefore affirm the
judgment of the court below.
                            I
  Petitioner was an elected member of the Board of
Commissioners of DeKalb County, Georgia.  During the
period between March 1985 and October 1986, as part of an
effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
investigate allegations of public corruption in the Atlanta
area, particularly in the area of rezonings of property, an
FBI agent posing as a real estate developer talked on the
telephone and met with petitioner on a number of occa-
sions.  Virtually all, if not all, of those conversations were
initiated by the agent and most were recorded on tape or
video.  In those conversations, the agent sought petitioner's
assistance in an effort to rezone a 25-acre tract of land for
high-density residential use.  On July 25, 1986, the agent

handed petitioner cash totaling $7,000 and a check, payable
to petitioner's campaign, for $1,000.  Petitioner reported the
check, but not the cash, on his state campaign-financing
disclosure form; he also did not report the $7,000 on his
1986 federal income tax return.  Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Government, as we must in
light of the verdict, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S.
60, 80 (1942), we assume that the jury found that petitioner
accepted the cash knowing that it was intended to ensure
that he would vote in favor of the rezoning application and
that he would try to persuade his fellow commissioners to
do likewise.  Thus, although petitioner did not initiate the
transaction, his acceptance of the bribe constituted an
implicit promise to use his official position to serve the
interests of the bribe-giver.
  In a two-count indictment, petitioner was charged with
extortion in violation of 18 U. S. C. 1951 and with failure
to report income in violation of 26 U. S. C. 7206(1).  He
was convicted by a jury on both counts.  With respect to the
extortion count, the trial judge gave the following instruc-
tion:
      ``The defendant contends that the $8,000 he received
    from agent Cormany was a campaign contribution.  The
    solicitation of campaign contributions from any person
    is a necessary and permissible form of political activity
    on the part of persons who seek political office and
    persons who have been elected to political office.  Thus,
    the acceptance by an elected official of a campaign
    contribution does not, in itself, constitute a violation of
    the Hobbs Act even though the donor has business
    pending before the official.
    ``However, if a public official demands or accepts money
    in exchange for [a] specific requested exercise of his or
    her official power, such a demand or acceptance does
    constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act regardless of
    whether the payment is made in the form of a cam-
    paign contribution.''  App. 16-17.

  In affirming petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals
noted that the instruction did not require the jury to find
that petitioner had demanded or requested the money, or
that he had conditioned the performance of any official act
upon its receipt.  910 F. 2d 790, 796 (CA11 1990).  The
Court of Appeals held, however, that ``passive acceptance of
a benefit by a public official is sufficient to form the basis
of a Hobbs Act violation if the official knows that he is
being offered the payment in exchange for a specific
requested exercise of his official power.  The official need
not take any specific action to induce the offering of the
benefit.''  Ibid. (emphasis in original).
  This statement of the law by the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit is consistent with holdings in eight other
Circuits.  Two Circuits, however, have held that an
affirmative act of inducement by the public official is
required to support a conviction of extortion under color of
official right.  United States v. O'Grady, 742 F. 2d 682, 687
(CA2 1984) (en banc) (``Although receipt of benefits by a
public official is a necessary element of the crime, there
must also be proof that the public official did something,
under color of his public office, to cause the giving of
benefits''); United States v. Aguon, 851 F. 2d 1158, 1166
(CA9 1988) (en banc) (``We find ourselves in accord with the
Second Circuit's conclusion that inducement is an element
required for conviction under the Hobbs Act'').  Because the
majority view is consistent with the common-law definition
of extortion, which we believe Congress intended to adopt,
we endorse that position.
                           II
  It is a familiar ``maxim that a statutory term is generally
presumed to have its common-law meaning.''  Taylor v.
United States, 495 U. S. 575, 592 (1990).  As we have
explained, ``where Congress borrows terms of art in which
are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centu-
ries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster
of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the
body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning
its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.  In such case, absence of contrary direction may
be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions,
not as a departure from them.''  Morissette v. United States,
342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952).
  At common law, extortion was an offense committed by a
public official who took ``by colour of his office'' money that
was not due to him for the performance of his official
duties.  A demand, or request, by the public official was
not an element of the offense.  Extortion by the public
official was the rough equivalent of what we would now
describe as ``taking a bribe.''  It is clear that petitioner
committed that offense.  The question is whether the
federal statute, insofar as it applies to official extortion, has
narrowed the common-law definition.
  Congress has unquestionably expanded the common-law
definition of extortion to include acts by private individuals
pursuant to which property is obtained by means of force,
fear, or threats.  It did so by implication in the Travel Act,
18 U. S. C. 1952, see United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S.
286, 289-296 (1969), and expressly in the Hobbs Act.  The
portion of the Hobbs Act that is relevant to our decision
today provides:
      ``(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays,
    or affects commerce or the movement of any article or
    commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
    attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
    physical violence to any person or property in further-
    ance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
    this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
    imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
      ``(b) As used in this section-
         .        .        .       .        .
      ``(2) The term `extortion' means the obtaining of prop-
    erty from another, with his consent, induced by wrong-
    ful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,
    or under color of official right.''  18 U. S. C. 1951.
  The present form of the statute is a codification of a 1946
enactment, the Hobbs Act, which amended the federal
Anti-Racketeering Act.  In crafting the 1934 Act, Congress
was careful not to interfere with legitimate activities
between employers and employees.  See H. R. Rep. No.
1833, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934).  The 1946 Amendment
was intended to encompass the conduct held to be beyond
the reach of the 1934 Act by our decision in United States
v. Teamsters, 315 U. S. 521 (1942).  The Amendment did
not make any significant change in the section referring to
obtaining property ``under color of official right'' that had
been prohibited by the 1934 Act.  Rather, Congress intend-
ed to broaden the scope of the Anti-Racketeering Act and
was concerned primarily with distinguishing between
``legitimate'' labor activity and labor ``racketeering,'' so as to
prohibit the latter while permitting the former.  See 91
Cong. Rec. 11899-11922 (1945).
  Many of those who supported the Amendment argued
that its purpose was to end the robbery and extortion that
some union members had engaged in, to the detriment of
all labor and the American citizenry.  They urged that the
Amendment was not, as their opponents charged, an anti-
labor measure, but rather, it was a necessary measure in
the wake of this Court's decision in United States v.
Teamsters.  In their view, the Supreme Court had mis-
takenly exempted labor from laws prohibiting robbery and
extortion, whereas Congress had intended to extend such
laws to all American citizens.  See, e.g., 91 Cong. Rec.
11910 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Springer) (``To my mind this
is a bill that protects the honest laboring people in our
country.  There is nothing contained in this bill that relates
to labor.  This measure, if passed, will relate to every
American citizen''); id., at 11912 (remarks of Rep. Jennings)
(``The bill is one to protect the right of citizens of this
country to market their products without any interference
from lawless bandits'').
  Although the present statutory text is much broader
than the common-law definition of extortion because it
encompasses conduct by a private individual as well as
conduct by a public official, the portion of the statute
that refers to official misconduct continues to mirror the
common-law definition.  There is nothing in either the
statutory text or the legislative history that could fairly be
described as a ``contrary direction,'' Morissette v. United
States, 342 U. S., at 263, from Congress to narrow the scope
of the offense.
  The legislative history is sparse and unilluminating with
respect to the offense of extortion.  There is a reference to
the fact that the terms ``robbery and extortion'' had been
construed many times by the courts and to the fact that the
definitions of those terms were ``based on the New York
law.''  89 Cong. Rec. 3227 (1943) (statement of Rep. Hobbs);
see 91 Cong. Rec. 11906 (1945) (statement of Rep. Robsion).
In view of the fact that the New York statute applied to a
public officer ``who asks, or receives, or agrees to receive''
unauthorized compensation, N. Y. Penal Code 557 (1881),
the reference to New York law is consistent with an intent
to apply the common-law definition.  The language of the
New York statute quoted above makes clear that extortion
could be committed by one who merely received an unautho-
rized payment.  This was the statute that was in force in
New York when the Hobbs Act was enacted.
  The two courts that have disagreed with the decision to
apply the common-law definition have interpreted the word
``induced'' as requiring a wrongful use of official power that
``begins with the public official, not with the gratuitous
actions of another.''  United States v. O'Grady, 742 F. 2d, at
691; see United States v. Aguon, 851 F. 2d, at 1166 (```in-
ducement' can be in the overt form of a `demand,' or in a
more subtle form such as `custom' or `expectation''').  If we
had no common-law history to guide our interpretation of
the statutory text, that reading would be plausible.  For two
reasons, however, we are convinced that it is incorrect.
  First, we think the word ``induced'' is a part of the
definition of the offense by the private individual, but not
the offense by the public official.  In the case of the private
individual, the victim's consent must be ``induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear.''
In the case of the public official, however, there is no such
requirement.  The statute merely requires of the public
official that he obtain ``property from another, with his
consent, . . . under color of official right.''  The use of the
word ``or'' before ``under color of official right'' supports this
reading.
  Second, even if the statute were parsed so that the word
``induced'' applied to the public officeholder, we do not
believe the word ``induced'' necessarily indicates that the
transaction must be initiated by the recipient of the bribe.
Many of the cases applying the majority rule have conclud-
ed that the wrongful acceptance of a bribe establishes all
the inducement that the statute requires.  They conclude
that the coercive element is provided by the public office
itself.  And even the two courts that have adopted an
inducement requirement for extortion under color of official
right do not require proof that the inducement took the
form of a threat or demand.  See United States v. O'Grady,
742 F. 2d, at 687; United States v. Aguon, 851 F. 2d, at
1166.
  Petitioner argues that the jury charge with respect to
extortion, see supra, at 2-3, allowed the jury to convict him
on the basis of the ``passive acceptance of a contribution.''
Brief for Petitioner 24.  He contends that the instruction
did not require the jury to find ``an element of duress such
as a demand,'' Brief for Petitioner 22, and it did not
properly describe the quid pro quo requirement for convic-
tion if the jury found that the payment was a campaign
contribution.
  We reject petitioner's criticism of the instruction, and
conclude that it satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of
McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. - (1991), because
the offense is completed at the time when the public official
receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform
specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an
element of the offense.  We also reject petitioner's conten-
tion that an affirmative step is an element of the offense of
extortion ``under color of official right'' and need be included
in the instruction.  As we explained above, our construc-
tion of the statute is informed by the common-law tradition
from which the term of art was drawn and understood.  We
hold today that the Government need only show that a
public official has obtained a payment to which he was not
entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for
official acts.
  Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that so many
other courts that have considered the issue over the last 20
years have interpreted the statute in the same way.
Moreover, given the number of appellate court decisions,
together with the fact that many of them have involved
prosecutions of important officials well known in the
political community, it is obvious that Congress is aware
of the prevailing view that common-law extortion is
proscribed by the Hobbs Act.  The silence of the body that
is empowered to give us a ``contrary direction'' if it does not
want the common-law rule to survive is consistent with an
application of the normal presumption identified in Taylor
and Morissette, supra.
                           III
  An argument not raised by petitioner is now advanced by
the dissent.  It contends that common-law extortion was
limited to wrongful takings under a false pretense of official
right.  Post, at 2-3; see post, at 4 (offense of extortion -was
understood ... [as] a wrongful taking under a false pretense
of official right-) (emphasis in original); post, at 5.  It is
perfectly clear, however, that although extortion accom-
plished by fraud was a well-recognized type of extortion,
there were other types as well.  As the court explained in
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 30 Pa. Super. 26 (1906), an
extortion case involving a payment by a would-be brothel
owner to a police captain to ensure the opening of her
house:

    -The form of extortion most commonly dealt with in the
    decisions is the corrupt taking by a person in office of
    a fee for services which should be rendered gratuitous-
    ly; or when compensation is permissible, of a larger fee
    than the law justifies, or a fee not yet due; but this is
    not a complete definition of the offense, by which I
    mean that it does not include every form of common-
    law extortion.-  Id., at 30.

See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470,
488-489 (1903) (defendants charged with and convicted of
conspiracy to extort because they accepted pay for obtaining
and procuring the election of certain persons to the position
of school-teachers); State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 456,
231 N.W. 225, 228 (1930) (alderman's acceptance of money
for the erection of a barn, the running of a gambling house,
and the opening of a filling station would constitute
extortion) (dicta); State v. Barts, 132 N.J.L. 74, 76, 83, 38
A.2d 838, 841, 844 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (police officer, who
received $1,000 for not arresting someone who had stolen
money, was properly convicted of extortion because -generi-
cally extortion is an abuse of public justice and a misuse by
oppression of the power with which the law clothes a public
officer-); White v. State, 56 Ga. 385, 389 (1876) (If a
ministerial officer used his position -for the purpose of
awing or seducing- a person to pay him a bribe that would
be extortion).
  The dissent's theory notwithstanding, not one of the cases
it cites, see post, at 4-5, and n. 3, holds that the public
official is innocent unless he has deceived the payor by
representing that the payment was proper.  Indeed, none
makes any reference to the state of mind of the payor, and
none states that a -false pretense- is an element of the
offense.  Instead, those cases merely support the proposition
that the services for which the fee is paid must be official
and that the official must not be entitled to the fee that he
collected-both elements of the offense that are clearly
satisfied in this case.  The complete absence of support for
the dissent's thesis presumably explains why it was not
advanced by petitioner in the District Court or the Court of
Appeals, is not recognized by any Court of Appeals, and is
not advanced in any scholarly commentary.
  The judgment is affirmed.
                                      It is so ordered.